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Miranda Warnings In Other Than
Police Custodial Interrogations
Marvin E. Sable*
IN 1966 THE SUPREME COURT of the United States took an in-depth
look at the custodial interrogation, and raised an eyebrow at the then-
current practices and investigative techniques of law enforcement
officials. In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, the court looked to the
interrogation which is done behind closed doors and conducted so as
to sever the accused from any outside support, thus placing him in a
position of insecurity and inability to stand on his rights.'
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in speaking for the court, declared that
the then current-practices of incommunicado interrogations were
at odds with one of our most cherished national principles. 2 The prin-
ciple that an individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself
was given added substance when the court went on to rule that:
. . . when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way
and is subjected to questioning, the principle against self-incrim-
ination is jeopardized, [and] .. . Procedural safeguards must be
employed to protect the privilege ...
The court then laid down minimum requirements for pre-inter-
rogation warnings,4 saying that such warnings were an absolute neces-
sity at the time of interrogation in order to overcome its inherent
pressures and to insure that individuals were made aware of their
right to freely exercise their constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination at that very moment in time.5
The court, in Miranda, was quick to point out, however, that the
decision in that case did not suppose to vitiate the confession as a tool
of law enforcement officers in ferretting out criminals. Likewise, vol-
unteered statements of any kind were specifically exempted from the
exclusionary rule that was applied to Miranda-type admissions only. 6
Much of the progeny of Miranda addressed itself to just such types
of admissions. Oftentimes, the courts dissected the seemingly unitized
custodial interrogation requirement of Miranda by turning their decisions
of its inapplicability upon the absence of either the "custody" or the
"interrogation" aspect.
* B.S., American University; Third-year student at Cleveland State University College
of Law.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 456 (1966).
a Id. at 457-8.
a Id. at 469.
4 Id. at 479.
5 Id. at 469.
& Id. at 478.
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Custodial Atmosphere Required
In United States v. McLeod,7 the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals refused
Appellant's claim that his conviction under the Internal Revenue Code
was error because I.R.S. agents failed to give him the Miranda warn-
ings in a telephone conversation. The court held that Miranda was
inapplicable to "non-custodial interrogations".8 Thus, while there may
be an interrogation, there is no right to Miranda warnings unless
coupled with custody of the accused, the purpose of Miranda being to
alleviate the pressures attendant to being cut off from the outside
world.
In a more narrow situation, a highway patrol officer asked a
driver for his license and registration, and after receiving unsatisfac-
tory reasons as to a failure to produce either, went on to question
the driver as to his destination and purpose. The court held Miranda
to be inapplicable since in that situation no "in custody interrogation"
takes place.9
In four more recent cases, one in Texas,1° one in North Carolina,11
one in the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, 12 and another in the 8th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals,1" (which refused to grant a writ of habeas
corpus from a South Dakota conviction"), the same custodial element
was found lacking.
While the application of Miranda requires that there be custody
of the accused, it need not be uniquely "stationhouse" custody. In
State v. Graves,15 the defendant was convicted of having obtained wel-
fare funds by false pretenses through her failure to disclose a change
in living conditions which, if disclosed, would have resulted in her
receiving reduced benefits. After a welfare investigator discovered
the changed condition, he contacted the defendant and arranged an
interview. At that interview, where 6 male investigators interrogated
the woman, one investigator testified that he gave partial Miranda
warnings. Strangely enough, the right to remain silent was left out.
In holding Miranda applicable and recognizing the error of the trial
court in admitting defendant's damaging statements, the court. said,
"It is important, also to note that the circumstances surrounding the
investigation contained clear elements of psychological duress.'1 6
7436 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1971).
8id. at 950.
U. S. v. Smith, 441 F. 2d 539, 540 (9th Cir. 1971).
1,Utz v. State, 465 S. W. 2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
11 State v. Fletcher, - N. C. - , 181 S. E. 2d 405, 409-10 (1971).
12 U. S. v. Viviano, 437 F. 2d 295, 301 (2nd Cir. 1971).
13 Utsler v. Erickson, 440 F. 2d 140 (8th Cir. 1971).
14 Utsler v. South Dakota, 285 Minn. 250, 171 N. W. 2d 739 (1969).
'5 114 N. J. Super. 222, 275 A.2d 760 (App. Div. 1971).




Thus, notwithstanding the interrogation was not at police head-
quarters, since the dangers inherent in the Miranda-type interrogation
were present, the accused was entitled to the full warnings that would
be required at the stationhouse.
Just as all interrogations might not be made under custodial con-
ditions, all custodial admissions are not necessarily in response to an
interrogation.
Interrogation Required
Where an officer asked no questions of the suspect but made a
remark, ("You just killed a woman"), which was merely a statement
of the reason for arrest, the defendant's ensuing statement was held
admissable at trial.17 In such cases, said the court, the police need not
interrupt a suspect's spontaneous statement in order to warn him of his
constitutional rights. Thus, any statement made in the absence of any
questioning is not rendered inadmissible for failure to give Miranda
warnings.
Simply stated, Miranda has no bearing upon the rights of a person
unless he is subject to interrogation while in custody.18
This interrogation aspect is better illustrated by a decision of the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals.19 In that case the defendant was under
arrest, in custody, and in a police cruiser when he made a damaging
utterance. The defendant was being transferred from a precinct station
to the central precinct station when he volunteered a confession to
the police totally free from any questioning on their part. The court
found no error in allowing that confession into evidence.20
A number of other jurisdictions have also ruled in accord in
similar situations. In these cases, various terms have been used to
describe the unprotected statements, such as conversation,21 spon-
taneous declaration,22 volunteered out of interrogation,23 and, simply,
volunteered.2 4
The constitutional demands and limitations upon law enforcement
officials are reasonably well defined. The constitutional rights of the
accused are, it is supposed, being properly safeguarded after arrest.
The law enforcement scene, however, is not quite that simplex today,
and the danger of self incrimination still lingers in certain situations,
which are continually increasing in number.
17 People v. Jenkins, - Ill. App. 2d-, 269 N. E. 2d 193, 20 (1971).
IsTompkins v. U. S., 272 A.2d 100, 102 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970).
19Klamert v. Cupp, 437 F. 2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1970).
20 Id. at 1154 n. 1 holding that an on the scene investigation is not subject to Miranda.
21 State v. Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 483 P. 2d 173, 175-6 (1971).
2Lewis v. People, - Colo. -, 483 P. 2d 949, 951-2 (1971).
23 State v. Chabonian, 50 Wis. 2d 574, 195 N. W. 2d 289, 291, n. 3 (1971).
24 People v. Griner, 30 Mich. App. 687, 186 N. W. 2d 800, 802 (1971).
Cook v. State, 248 S. 2d 158, 159 (Ala. Crim. App. 1971).
State v. Ginnings, 466 S. W. 2d 675 (Mo. 1971).
$ta~t v, Phippen, - Kan. - , 485 P. 2d 336, 340 (1971).
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Miranda Not Applicable to Other
Than Police Custodial Interrogations
While of course we still have police protection provided by our
federal, state, county and municipal governments, a new breed of
law enforcer is creeping into the role as public protector. The uni-
formed employees of the street association 25 as well as the private
security force of the larger retail and discount outlets are taking an
increasingly heavy role in present day law enforcement.
As was set out above, while the police power of the sovereignty
demands that it be executed to protect the populace, there are con-
stitutional limitations upon the methods by which police can lawfully
ferret out an accused and develop a case against him.
With the advent of the private patrolman, the courts have under-
taken the task of determining what application if any, Miranda has to
custodial interrogations made by a private citizen after he has arrested
another.
It should be kept in mind that although there is weighty author-
ity establishing the inapplicability of Miranda to any other than police
employed by a sovereign authority, such case law is divisible into two
distinct private arrest-interrogation situations. They are: the purely
private citizen and the private citizen employed as a security guard.
Private Citizen
In State v. Masters, a woman was convicted of shoplifting 54c worth
of toilet deodorizers from the Hinky Dinky Market. 26 A store clerk
had seen the defendant (who had otherwise paid for approximately
$11 in purchases) place two toilet deodorizers in her purse. After
stopping the woman at the store exit, he asked her if she had anything
she hadn't paid for. The woman responded by taking the "loot" out
of her purse. The Iowa Supreme Court held nothing in Miranda was
applicable and refused defendant's contention that the deodorizers
were improperly admitted into evidence.27
Elsewhere, a shoplifting defendant objected to the admission of
incriminating statements made by him to a store sales clerk. The
court refused his assertions of error and held that no interpretation
could be justified that would apply "Miranda to a point where its
rules would include the interrogation process of an accused by an
apprehending shopkeeper not regularly engaged in law enforcement
work."28
25 N. Y. Times, July 8, 1971, at 33, col. 1; Se'e also Cleveland Yellow Pages, 1971-72 at
371-73 for listing of 59 detective agencies in Cleveland area alone and at 548-9, a
listing of 38 guard and patrol services.
20 261 Iowa 366, 154 N. W. 2d 133 (1967).
27 State v. Masters, 261 Iowa 366, 154 N. V. 2d 133, 136 (1967).




Another defendant, convicted of rape in the Criminal Court of
Baltimore, Maryland, asserted to no avail that his statements to two
pharmacists who rushed out of their drug store to apprehend him
were inadmissable for failure of them to give him Miranda warnings.
2 9
The court also noted that there was an absence of "a custodial inter-
rogation. . .."30
In a case more directly in point, a fire insurance agent intimidated
two claimants into making damaging admissions leading to their con-
viction on arson charges. The trial judge raised an interesting point,
saying that the agent's appearance before the grand jury was enough
to bring the case within Miranda, but went on to hold the statements
inadmissible because the agent allegedly posed as a fire marshal. The
court of appeals (Illinois) held Miranda was applicable to law enforce-
ment officers only,31 and reversed.
Additionally, Miranda has been found inapplicable to questioning
by a school principal 32 and to an arrest made by the victim of a
defendant convicted of assault with a weapon.3
The inapplicability of the United States Constitution to private
individuals having no customary function as law enforcers is perhaps
the proper rationale. The persuasiveness of this "non-governmental"
affected arrest argument begins to corrode when applied to private
citizens regularly working as security guards, albeit for private em-
ployers, but quasi public by their very nature.
Private Security Guards
In addition to the five jurisdictions above cited, (notes 27-33), in
at least nine more jurisdictions courts have held Miranda inapplicable
to private persons, even when the private persons to whom the ad-
missions were made were private security guards regularly employed
for that distinct function and purpose.
3 4
U. S. v. Antonelli involved a case where the defendant made an
inculpatory statement to a guard employed by a private detective
agency to guard a pier. The statement made to the suspecting guard,
'9 Hubbard v. Maryland, 2 Md. App. 364, 234 A.2d 775 (1967), etrt. denitd, 393 U. S.
889 (1968).
30 Id. at 364, 234 A.2d at 779.
31 People v. Vleck, 114 Ill. App. 2d, 74, 252, N. E. 2d 377, 380 (1969).
32 People v. Shipp, 96 Il. App. 2d 364-, 239 N. E. 2d 296 (1968).
31 State v. Kemp, 251 La. 592, 205 S. 2d. 411 (1967).
34 2nd Cir.-U. S. v. Antonelli, 434 F. 2d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 1970).
9th Cir.-U. S. v. Birnstihl, 441 F. 2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1970).
Ariz.-State v. Hess, 9 Ariz. App. 29, 449 P. 2d 20, 46 (1969).
Cal.-People v. Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1967).
Mich.-People v. Morgan, 24 Mich. App. 660, 180 N. W. 2d 84-2 (1970).
N. M.-State v. Archuleta, 482 P. 2d 242 (N. M. Ct. App. 1970).
N. Y.-People v. Frank, 52 Misc. 2d 266, 275 N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1966); People v. Wil-
liams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N. Y. S. 2d 251 (City Ct. Syracuse 1967).
Nev.-Schaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432 P. 2d 500 (1967).
Ohio-State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15 (1971).
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who had the defendant open his trunk and found stolen goods, was
admitted over timely objection. The court there held that Miranda
applied only to police or "other law enforcement officers" and not
to any other than governmental agencies.3 5
In another instance, two investigators, specially hired for the pur-
pose, administered a polygraph test to a store employee. After noting
irregularities in the test results, one of the investigators interrogated
the woman employee for 3 hours without extending any Miranda type
warnings to her. The court interpreted Miranda as restricted solely to
a "police" interrogation and denied defendant's pleas.36
Other jurisdictions have seized upon this private aspect, reasoning
that a private investigator is not an officer of the law, 7 and also
refused to accept the suggestion by one defendant that since the con-
fession obtained by the private investigator led to his eventual con-
viction, that the investigator was acting as "agent" of the prosecutor.
3 8
In People v. Wright, a security guard employed by a county general
hospital, which was both owned and operated by a governmental
agency, was held not to be such a person as is subject to the require-
ments of Miranda.39 The court said it was no matter that an employee's
duties may be restricted to protection of property, nor that he may
be employed by the state. "What does matter", said the court, "is
whether he is employed by an agency of government . . .whose pri-
mary mission is to enforce the law."40
It is difficult to fathom the courts' infatuation with the literal
terms used in Miranda. Clearly, all the cases consolidated for trial in
Miranda dealt exclusively with the police of some governmental unit.
This is reason enough for the court's usage of the term "authorities"'41
since the operative facts of Miranda required no broader terminology
under the circumstances. This is certainly not to say that the spirit
of Miranda does not extend its literal terms further where circum-
stances warrant it.
A person's rights are no less abused, a person no less injured and
victimized, when he is convicted of an offense by use of evidence that
is obtained by a private person, which if obtained in the same way
by a police officer would be inadmissible. The fact remains that where
a person is convicted of a crime, on the basis of evidence obtained
after arrest, without first being warned of the rights he holds as a
"person" 42 much less a citizen to remain silent after his arrest, that
conviction is repugnant to the manifest purpose of the Bill of Rights.
35 U. S. v. Antonelli, 43+ F. 2d 335, 337 (2nd Cir. 1970).
36 State v. Hess, 9 Ariz. App. 29, 449 P. 2d 46, 49 (1969).
37People v. Morgan, 24 Mich. App. 660, 190 N. W. 2d 842, 843 (1970).
39 State v. Archuleta, 482 P. 2d 242, 248 (N. M. Ct. App. 1970).
39 People v. Wright, 249 Cal. App. 2d 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1967).401d. at 692, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
4 tMiranda v. Arizona, 384. U. S. 436, 472 (1966).




Where the arrest is made by a private citizen the abuse is not so
evident. Where, however, the arrest is consummated by a private citi-
zen regularly engaged in private law enforcement the situation takes
on new flavor.
The Private Patrolman-
A Case for Application of Miranda
State Authority
At least thirty United States jurisdictions have special statutory
provisions empowering a private citizen to make a lawful arrest. There
are six distinct types of statutes, each prescribing varying degrees of
latitude or situations in which a private person may arrest another.
In eighteen jurisdictions, the statutory provision is substantially
as follows: 43
A private person may arrest another:
1. For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2. When the person arrested has committed a felony although
not in his presence.
3. Where a felony has been in fact committed, and he has
reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have
committed it.
In Arizona, North Carolina and Texas, a private person may
arrest for a misdemeanor only if it constitutes a breach of the peace
or for a felony actually committed upon probable cause that the per-
son arrested has committed the offense. 44 There are, in addition, four
43 Alaska-Alaska Stat. § 12.25.030 (1962).
Ala.-Code of Ala. tit. 15, § 159 (1958).
Cal.-Cal. Penal Code Ann. tit. 3 § 837 (West 1970).
Ga.-Ga. Code Ann. § 27-211 (1935).
Hawaii-Hawaii Rev. Stat. tit. 37 § 708-3,-4 (1968).
Idaho-Idaho Code Ann. § 19-604 (1948).
Iowa-Iowa Code Ann. § 755.5 (1969).
Mich.-Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 764.16 (1967).
Minn.-Minn. Stat. Ann. § 629.37 (1969).
Miss.-Miss. Code Ann. § 2470 (1942).
Mont.-Rev. Code of Mont. Ann. tit. 95 ch. 6 § 11 (1947).
Nev.-Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 171 § 126 (1968).
N. Y.-N. Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 183 (West 1970).
N. D.-N. D. Cent. Code ch. 29-06 § 20 (1970).
Okla.-Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 202 (1969).
S. D.-S. D. Compiled Laws Ann. ch. 23-22 § 14 (1967).
Tenn.-Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-816 (1955).
Utah-Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-4 (1953).
44 Ariz.-Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1304 (1956).
N..C.-N. C. Gen. Stat. ch. 15 § 39-40 (1965).
Tex.-Code of Crim. Pr. of Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 1401 (1966).
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more types of state statutes empowering private persons to make
arrests under more narrow circumstances. 45
. The power of a private person to arrest at common law extended
to the felony and breach of peace categories, but, "unless modified
by statute, it would seem, where the arrest is for a misdemeanor, that
the offense must amount to a breach of the peace to justify a person
in arresting without a warrant. '46 It therefore appears that at least
twenty-three American jurisdictions have abrogated the common law
by extending the private persons' power to arrest to petit larceny and
other misdemeanors against property.
Many states have, in effect, extended the long arm of the law into
the discount store, department store, warehouse and even to the city
streets4 7 by the only means economically and practically feasible -
the private cop. In addition to the above statutes at least a dozen
states have statutes relieving the mercantile establishment from the
worry of liability for incidents growing out of the law enforcement
function of their private security guards.48
In State v. Bolan, the court said that the purport of Miranda "does
not include private citizens not directed or controlled by a law enforce-
ment agency, even though their efforts might aid in law enforce-
ment."49 The requirements of due process are mandates upon state
-5 (1) In cases of felony only:
Ark.-Ark. Stat. Ann. ch. 4 § 43-402,-404 (1964).
Ky.-Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.005 (1970).
La.-La. Code Crim. Pro. tit. 5, art. 214 (1966).
S. C.-Code S. C. § 17-251-52 (1962).
(2) For criminal offense committed in presence only:
Colo.-Colo. Rev. Stat. ch. 39 art. 2-20 (1963).
Ind.-Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1024 (1956).
(3) For any offense other than an ordinance qiolation:
11.-IlI. Ann. Stat. ch. 38 § 107-3 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
(4) For petit larceny or felony:
Neb.-Rev. Stat. of Neb. ch. 29 art. 4 § 29.402 (1968).
Wyo.-Wyo. Stat. Ann. ch. 8 § 7-156 (1967).
46 6 C. J. S. .qrrest § 8, p. 605-7; see also PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 870, 874 (1957).
47 N. Y. Times, July 8, 1971, at 33, col. 1.
4SKan.-Kan. Star. Ann. § 21-535 (B) (1969).
La.-La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 5, § 215 (1966).
Md.-Md. Ann. Code art 27, § 551 (A) (C) (1957).
Mass.-Ann. Laws of Mass. ch. 231 § 94B (1971).
Mich.-Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2917 (1967).
Minn.-Minn. Stat. Ann. § 622.27 (West 1969).
Neb.-Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29.402.03 (1968).
N. D.-N. D. Cent. Code ch. 29-06 § 27 (1970).
Ohio-Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2935.041 (Anderson 1970).
Va.-Code of Va. § 18.1-27 (1960)
W. Va.-W. Va. Code Ann. art. 61 § 3A-4 (1966).
Wyo.-Wyo. Stat. Ann, ch. 7 § 6-146.2 (1967).
40 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 18 (1971). Private security guards detained a juvenile for shoplifting
a pair of gloves from the department store and testimony of the guards as to his
admissions to them during the interrogations were admitted and such admissions




action, not merely state action through its police force. When the
state invites, no less seduces, the use of private police to enforce its
criminal laws, such enforcement is surely state related and may be
tainted by the private policeman much the same way the government
payrolled policeman might so taint it. It should make no difference
that the police may not have invited the action since the state has
taken that step directly.
A California court has held that their state statute 0 does not
turn a citizen into a law enforcement officer and refused to apply
Miranda to an arrest made by a private person.5 1 There is no benefit
of ratio decidendi reported in that opinion.
The spirit of Miranda would seem to be that when an arrest and
interrogation is consummated by a "private policeman", with the same
onerous character possessed by official lawmen, the wall between
government and private action begins to crumble. The private lawman
whose efforts accrue to the state, and who is empowered by special
statute to make arrests, is, although employed by the private sector,
performing an integral public law enforcement function. This function
should take on the responsibilities of all other public action and must
not take precedence over fundamental rights.
State Action
The spirit of Miranda v. Arizona is the prevention of the injustice
of self incriminated convictions. The warnings are given to reduce
"the inherently compulsive aspects . . .found to exist in the process
of custodial interrogations."52
This same "potentiality for compulsion found in custodial inter-
rogations initiated by police officers . . . ," cannot be denied to exist
likewise, in an interrogation by private security police. The empty
sinking feeling that must accompany a 13-year-old boy (as in State v.
Bolan54) into a department store's security office, flanked by an armed
and uniformed guard, equals (if not surpasses) the very compulsion
at the heart of Miranda. When a court of law, any court of law, de-
grades its chambers by allowing a confession obtained in this manner
to find its way into evidence, it condones, ratifies and approves the
very act itself. Without judicial fiat, interrogations made in deroga-
tion of an accused's right to remain silent, would be useless. To admit
a confession into evidence under these conditions, without Miranda
warnings having been given first, is to breathe life and purpose into
such practices by using their fruits as a means toward conviction. 54a
'8 Cal. Penal Code Ann. tit. 3 § 837 (West 1970).
51 People v. Cheatham, 263 Cal. App. 2d 458, 69 Cal. Rptr. 679, 682 (1968).
52 U. S. v. Viviano, 437 F. 2d 295, 300 (2nd Cir. 1971).
53 Schaumberg v. State, 83 Nev. 372, 432 P. 2d 500, 501 (1967).
54 State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15 (1971).
54a Shelley v. Kraemer, 334- U. S. 1 (1948) the genesis of the state action doctrine estab-
lishing that the Fourteenth Amendment refers to exertions of state power in all forms.
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Mr. Justice Brandeis, in his brilliant dissenting opinion in Ohnstead
v. U. S-11 stated that:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subject to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrup-
ulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law breaker,
it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy ... 16 [Emphasis supplied].
The Miranda court noted also that the framers of the Constitution
were aware of the subtle encroachments on individual liberty and
knew that "illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first
footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure. ' 57
Judge Joseph F. Falco, sitting on the City Court of Syracuse in
People v. Williams,58 ruled Miranda inapplicable to other than police
custodial interrogations. Judge Falco said, however, that:
This court is bound by the decisions laid down by the higher
courts but entertains some doubt as to what the result might be
in a proper case of this kind in light of the recent decisions of this
area by the Supreme Court of the United States. 59
Conclusion
When a private policeman makes an arrest, he is making that
arrest for the violation of a state statute or municipal ordinance and
delivering up the accused to government law enforcement officials,
knowing the whole while that this is his major purpose and function.
He is in effect the "alter ego" of the city police department. He is a
"de facto" member of the public police force and cannot be permitted
to trespass upon people's inherent rights because a Department Store
and not the local government pays his salary. The courts should not
ratify unlawful conduct to the detriment of any accused. Our courts
must not grant free rein to private security forces no matter how
neatly uniformed and well organized. The vigilante is an anachronism,
or should be. While private police protect valuable private property,
the courts should not allow them to do so at the expense of private
rights.
55277 U. S. 438, 495 (1929) which was cited approvingly in Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, 479-80 (1966).
56 Olmstead was later overruled by Katz v. U. S., 389 U. S. 34-7 (1967).
57 384 U. S. 436, 459 (1966) citing Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616, 635 (1886).
58 People v. Williams, 53 Misc. 2d 1086, 281 N. Y. S. 2d 251 (City Ct. Syracuse 1967).




As Chief Justice Warren noted in Miranda, and as the court's
rulings on this issue to date have failed to emphasize-
... our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but
of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed
be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and
power. Its general principles would have little value, and be con-
verted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formula. Rights
declared in words might be lost in reality.60
60 384 U. S. 436, 443 (1966).
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1972
